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Abstract 
Use of intelligent decision aids can help alleviate the challenges of planning complex operations. 
We describe integrated algorithms, and a tool capable of translating a high-level concept for a 
tactical military operation into a fully detailed, actionable plan, producing automatically (or with 
human guidance) plans with realistic degree of detail and of human-like quality. Tight interleaving 
of several algorithms -- planning, adversary estimates, scheduling, routing, attrition and 
consumption estimates -- comprise the computational approach of this tool. Although originally 
developed for Army large-unit operations, the technology is generic and also applies to a number of 
other domains, particularly in critical situations requiring detailed planning within a constrained 
period of time.  In this paper, we focus particularly on the engineering tradeoffs in the design of the 
tool. In an experimental evaluation, reminiscent of the Turing test, the tool's performance compared 
favorably with human planners.  
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The Quest for New Processes and Tools 
The US Army
1
 is exploring a significant computerization of the military planning process [1]: "...the 
Army must create fast new planning processes that establish a new division of labor between man and 
machine. … Decision aids will quickly offer suggestions and test alternative courses of actions."  
  The reasons for exploring potential benefits of such decision aids are multifaceted. The process 
of planning an Army operation remains relatively cumbersome, inflexible and slow. Life and death 
decisions are made by a relatively meager staff of perhaps 3-4 individuals, working with imperfect 
information under significant time constraints. Success typically depends on one’s ability to synchronize 
the movement of units and the concentration of firepower and other effects at a precise moment in time.   
  The tools available to the planners are generally limited to rudimentary decision aids for 
analyzing the terrain of the battlefield and some office automation tools to help record decisions.  The 
planners bring varying degrees of knowledge, experience and prejudices to the process.  The planning 
process frequently involves disagreements on estimation of outcomes, enemy reactions, attrition and 
consumption of supplies. There is a fundamental complexity of synchronization and effective utilization 
of multiple heterogeneous assets performing numerous, inter-dependent, heterogeneous tasks. 
  The Course of Action Development and Evaluation Tool (CADET), is a tool for producing 
automatically (or with human guidance) the detailed tasks required to translate a basic concept into a 
fully formed, actionable plan, which is a key step in the military’s standard decision making process.  
This step involves taking the proposed courses of action for the friendly forces, developed in a previous 
step and initially expressed as high-level concepts, and expanding them into the hundreds of supporting 
tasks required to accomplish the intended objective.  Concurrently, the friendly course of action is tested 
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against the most likely and/or the most dangerous courses of action available to the enemy.  The intent 
of this analysis, called wargaming in the military, is to produce an analytical baseline from which the 
commander can choose the best course of action [2].  The process is particularly challenging for a 
relatively large and complex unit such as a Division, where the actions of 12,000 soldiers and over 3,000 
weapons must be coordinated to produce a desired effect.  Wargaming a potential tactical course of 
action for such a large unit typically involves a staff of 3-4 persons with in-depth knowledge of both 
friendly and enemy tactics.2   
 The input for their effort comes usually from the unit Commander in the form of two doctrinally 
defined products: a Course of Action (COA) sketch (e.g., Fig. 1) and a Course of Action statement -- a 
high-level specification of the operation. In effect, such a sketch and statement comprise a set of high-
level actions, goals, and sequencing, referring largely to movements and objectives of the friendly 
forces, e.g., “Task Force Arrow attacks along axis Bull to complete the destruction of the 2nd Red 
Battalion.”  Typically, the unit Commander will develop a minimum of three courses of action for 
consideration, distinguishable from one another in force composition and application, designation of 
main and supporting efforts or in utilization of terrain and resources.  The human planner applies his or 
her knowledge of the art of war to the creation of the courses of action so that each may generally be 
assumed, on the surface, to be feasible.   
  With this input, working as a team for several hours (typically 2 to 8 hours), the members of the 
planning staff examine the elements of each friendly Course of Action (COA) in detail.  The process 
involves planning and scheduling of the detailed tasks required to accomplish the specified COA; 
allocation of tasks to the diverse forces comprising the Division or the Brigade; assignment of suitable 
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locations and routes; estimates of friendly and enemy battle losses (attrition); predictions of enemy 
actions or reactions, etc.   
 The outcome of the process is usually recorded in a synchronization matrix [2], a type of Gantt 
chart. Time periods constitute the columns. Functional classes of actions, such as the Battlefield 
Operating Systems, are the rows (see Fig. 2). Examples include maneuver, logistics, military 
intelligence, etc. The content of this plan, recorded largely in the matrix cells, includes the tasks and 
actions of the multiple subunits and assets of the friendly force; their objectives and manner of 
execution, expected timing, dependencies and synchronization; routes and locations; availability of 
supplies, combat losses, enemy situation and actions, etc.  
  Although the immediate product may look like a prescriptive schedule, the purpose of the 
COA analysis process is certainly not to impose a rigid script for the battle. Rather, the purpose is to 
ascertain the feasibility of the COA, to assess its likelihood of success against a particular enemy COA, 
and to identify the range of probable actions and the points of synchronization for participants.  
Comparing the results of the wargames for the possible courses of action, the commander selects the 
best COA, in terms of accomplishing his desired intent with most effective application of resources.  
The final product is an executable COA translated into a synchronized operational plan.  
How CADET is Used 
In this complex, difficult and time-consuming process, the Course of Action Development and 
Evaluation Tool (CADET) assists military planners by rapidly translating an initial, high-level COA into 
a detailed battle plan, and wargaming the plan to determine if it is feasible.  Working with the planner in 
a series of user/computer actions, the system details, resources, schedules, elaborates, and analyzes the 
COA. 
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 In brief, the human planner defines the high-level COA via a user interface (e.g., Fig. 3) that 
enables him to enter the information comparable to the conventional COA sketch and statement (e.g., 
Fig. 1), which the COA-entry interface then transforms into an input to CADET proper, a collection of 
formal assertions and/or objects, including typically on the order of 2-20 high-level tasks.  Fig. 4 
outlines an input to CADET. Essentially an electronic representation of a traditional sketch-and-
statement, it describes the friendly and enemy units, control measures (e.g., boundaries of areas), 
network of traversable terrain (e.g., mobility corridors), the high-level scheme of maneuver represented 
as a set of activities (including the estimates of enemy activities), and temporal relationships between the 
activities. Most entities have numerous attributes in addition to those shown here; they can take a default 
value or be specified explicitly by the human planner. This definition of the COA is transferred to 
CADET, which proceeds to expand this high-level specification into a detailed plan/schedule of the 
operation.  
 Within this expansion process, CADET decomposes friendly tasks into more detailed actions; 
determines the necessary supporting relations, allocates / schedules tasks to friendly assets; takes into 
account dependencies between tasks and availability of assets; estimates enemy actions and reactions; 
devises friendly counter-actions; and estimates paths of movements, timing requirements, force attrition 
and supply consumption. The resulting detailed, scheduled and wargamed plan often consists of up to 
500 detailed actions with a wealth of supporting detail (e.g., Fig. 5a and 5b).  
  Having completed this process (largely automatically, in about 20 seconds on a mid-level laptop 
computer), CADET displays the results to the user (e.g., Fig. 6 and 7) as a synchronization matrix and/or 
as animated movements on the map-based interface. The user then reviews the results and may either 
change the original specification of the COA or directly edit the detailed plan.  Once a satisfactory 
product is reached (typically within 5 to 30 minutes), the user utilizes it to present the analysis of the 
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courses of action to the Commander, and to produce operational orders.  While the tool can make no 
claims of producing an optimal plan (indeed, it is highly dependent on the quality of the COA sketch 
and statement which originated with the unit Commander), it does provide a strong measure of the 
plan’s technical feasibility in a short amount of time.  With the tool helping speed along the application 
of the science of war, the unit Commander has more time available to apply his brainpower to the art of 
war.  General George S. Patton, Jr. recognized the need for speed over optimality when he asserted “[A] 
good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week” [17].   
  Recently, several efforts have utilized the planning capability of CADET. The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) used CADET for its Command Post of the Future 
Program and the Army’s Battle Command Battle Laboratories used it to complement the capabilities of 
course of action tools being developed at Fort Leavenworth and at Fort Huachuca.
3
  At this time, 
CADET is apparently the first and so far the only tool that was demonstrated to generate Army battle 
plans with realistic degree of detail and completeness, for multiple battle operating systems, and for the 
large scale and scope associated with such large, complex organizations as an Army Division or a 
Brigade. In the related domain of small-unit operations, Tate [5] has described a very mature work.  
  In experimental evaluations (discussed later), a CADET-assisted planner performed dramatically 
faster than a conventional human-only planning staff, with comparable quality of planning products. 
  Although originally developed for Army large-unit operations, CADET is largely generic and 
can be applied to a broad range of tasks that require interleaving of planning, resource scheduling and 
spatial movements. Being a knowledge-based tool, CADET is adapted to a new application domain by 
changing its knowledge base. In particular, we have already built exploratory demonstrations for such 
                                                     
3 Battle Command Battle Lab-Leavenworth chose CADET as a key element for its Integrated Course of Action Critiquing 
and Evaluation System (ICCES) program [3]. Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca integrated CADET with a military 
intelligence system called All Source Analysis System-Light to provide a planner for intelligence assets and to wargame 
enemy courses of action against friendly courses of action. 
8 
tasks as intelligence collection using scouts and unmanned aerial vehicles; combat tasks of robotic 
forces; and responses to terrorism incidence in an urban environment. 
Key Requirements and Challenges of the Problem Domain 
The needs of the problem domain clearly do not allow one to focus a useful decision aid on a narrow 
slice of the problem, e.g., only planning, scheduling, or routing. Strong dependencies exist between 
these aspects of the overall problem.  
 For example, considering the coupling between planning and scheduling, the activities of a 
military unit may differ dramatically depending on whether the timing of its arrival to a location occurs 
merely minutes before or after the arrival of the adversary units.  The activities (planning) and timing 
(scheduling) associated with a move of a unit can affect the suitable route, e.g., the unit may have to take 
a more circuitous route in order to avoid detection by the enemy unit expected to threaten an area during 
a certain time period. The route, in turn, affects both the timing and the activities performed by the unit, 
e.g., a unit may have to bypass an enemy unit, or to perform a passage of friendly lines, or to require a 
set of logistics-related activities to supply the unit enroute. The attrition (losses of personnel and 
equipment to enemy actions or to breakdowns) and consumption of supplies such as fuel and 
ammunition depend strongly on the activities and movements of the unit. In turn, attrition and 
consumption affect the suitability and feasibility of certain activities that a unit can perform. Obviously, 
the overall decision-making process must also include elements of adversarial reasoning such as 
determination of enemy actions and reactions to friendly actions. Interestingly, the presence of an 
adversary tends to exacerbate the multi-directional coupling that exists between the different aspects of 
the problem -- planning, scheduling, routing, adversary prediction, attrition and consumption estimation. 
The pervasive nature of the coupling suggests that a strong integration (unification) of all the associated 
computational processes is required [6, 7, 28].  
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 Also significant is the breadth of coverage in terms of the functional classes of tasks that must be 
explored and planned by the decision aid. While maneuver tasks are central to the battle, other functions, 
such as logistics or military intelligence are interdependent with the maneuver tasks and must be all 
analyzed in close integration. 
  In spite of the complexity implicit in these multiple interdependent problem aspects, speed is 
extremely important.  We envision that the user would approach a tool like CADET somewhat similarly 
to a spreadsheet: he would enter or modify key elements of a COA and then expect to see the 
recalculated details of the plan almost instantaneously. There can be multiple iterations of modifications 
and recalculations, and it is most reasonable for a user in field conditions to expect a fast response in the 
order of seconds. Such a performance must be achieved with a laptop computer, perhaps even a 
handheld computer.  
  Because of rapidly changing elements of tactics, often evolving as operations unfold, and the 
differences in styles and procedures of different units and commanders, it is also imperative to provide a 
decision aid with the means to modify its knowledge base literally in field conditions, by end user, non-
programmer. 
  Given that CADET is most likely to be in a framework of a larger deployed system, with its own 
style and implementation of the user interface, it is important to make the decision aid largely 
independent of user interface assumptions.  For the same reason it is important to provide convenient 
and flexible means for interfacing the decision-aid component with other systems, including the case 
when the two systems do not share a common ontology. 
Possible Approaches, Criteria and Tradeoffs 
Given the challenges outlined in the previous section, we adopted the following set of primary criteria 
for selecting the technical approach to solving the CADET problem.  
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 (a) A suitable technical approach must integrate closely the subproblems of planning, resource 
scheduling and movement routing.  
 (b) The approach must be frugal in terms of the knowledge base required, while covering a broad 
range of actions and effects present in the domain. 
 (c) Adversarial reasoning must be an integral component of the technical approach. 
 (d)  It must comply with the intended concept of the application use: the system must provide 
automated battle planning within the constraints of user’s high-level plan concept, and within the 
established doctrinal rules understandable to the user.     
 Armed with these criteria, let us evaluate some of the alternative approaches potentially 
applicable to CADET’s problem.  
 Planning being the central theme of CADET’s application, it is appropriate here to explore 
applicability of classical planning techniques and their extensions. In this broad field of approaches, the 
world is represented by a state model, actions lead from one state to another, and the objective of the 
problem solver is to find a sequence of actions that lead from the initial state to the goal state or states. A 
recent surge of advances in the field has been originated by the powerful Graphplan solver [19].  
 From the CADET’s needs perspective, these approaches do not meet several criteria. First, the 
need for resource scheduling and movements routing within the planning process. Although there is an 
active area of research in temporal planning where the classical planning model is extended to account 
for temporal constraints, it does not cover all the issues involved with resource-constrained scheduling 
(e.g., [27]). Second, when applied to realistic problems, the state model becomes excessively large and 
difficult to build which leads for strong arguments that practical problems are best solved by knowledge-
based planning rather than classical planning approaches (e.g.., [20]). 
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 In our approach, as discussed later, CADET integrates closely resource allocation and scheduling 
within an interleaved planning-scheduling process, and uses a frugal knowledge representation typical of 
knowledge-based planning that does not require an explicit state and action model. CADET’s approach 
comes with tradeoffs: it does not enjoy the theoretical rigor, optimality and provable properties 
characteristic of many approaches built on classical planning. 
 An example of a practical extension to classical planning is SIPE-2 [22] which avoids many of 
the limitations of classical planning by adopting a more flexible and potentially more frugal 
representational scheme. This approach also demonstrated successes in a loose integration with a 
resource scheduler OPIS [21]. Like CADET, development of SIPE-2 has been motivated by challenges 
of military planning problem.  
 In exploring the applicability of SIPE-2 to CADET problem, we note (a) SIPE-2’s restricted and 
limited integration with scheduling, especially as may relate to the time-space routing requirements of 
CADET and (b) lack of provisions for integrated adversarial reasoning. In CADET, routing and resource 
scheduling are tightly integrated and adversarial reasoning is a part of the overall planning process.  
 If we were to adopt SIPE-2, we could have availed ourselves of its rich facilities and available 
integration with other components that support automated plan monitoring, reactive plan repair, 
extensive user interfaces and knowledge-base authoring tools. However, it was felt that these were less 
critical to CADET application then the requirements of tight integration of scheduling, routing, and 
adversarial actions.    
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Prominent among approaches with specific emphasis on adversarial actions is Adversarial Planner (AP) 
-- a state-based, application-independent, hierarchical-task-network planner [23]. Its adversarial 
reasoning process models the Army's action-reaction-counteraction COA planning protocol.  
 AP’s problem solver determines adversary’s likely counteraction by searching for actions that 
would negate a precondition for own action. Although originally developed for military applications, AP 
has been recently applied to control and robotic in space applications [24] where variety of adverse 
conditions and breakdowns are analogous to a military adversary. 
 Applicability of AP’s approach to CADET faces concerns with respect to at least three criteria: 
(a) explicit encoding of actions pre- and post-conditions demands a rather expensive, state-based 
representation scheme; (b) resource scheduling is not an integral part of AP even though temporal 
planning is, and (c) it is doubtful that users would be comfortable with a solution process that 
automatically determines suitable counteractions in a manner that may not be transparent to the user. 
Although use of AP would have provided the CADET system with AP’s inherent execution monitoring 
and reactive repair mechanisms, these were not critical considerations for the CADET application. 
 A different class of approaches to planning in adversarial environments is based on game-
theoretic techniques. Examples include recent work in application to battle planning and control [25], 
[26]. The problem is formulated as a game and the goal is to determine the strategy that optimizes the 
objectives of the players. The resulting solution represents a plan of action for the players.  
 While  attractive in terms of explicit and rigorous treatment of problem’s adversarial aspects, 
such game-theoretic approaches fail to meet CADET’s criteria: (a) the  CADET solution must comply 
with the high-level strategy formulated by the user and  it is difficult to accomplish such a compliance 
within solution that automatically generates a strategy; (b) the cited approaches are effective for 
problems formulated in terms of spatial moves and weapon firings, while many of actions within a 
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CADET are of different nature (e.g., coordination between units) that do not lend themselves readily to a 
board game representation. In declining the use of game-theoretic approaches there was a tradeoff: 
CADET does not have a significant capability to generate automatically a sophisticated temporal-spatial 
strategy of actions, and must rely on the user to define such a high-level strategy. 
The CADET Technical Approach 
  Perhaps the most fundamental engineering choices were the basic functional focus and concept 
of user operation of the tool. CADET focuses on course of action analysis, which is the most time-
consuming aspect of the Military Decision Making Process.  Other researchers (e.g., [8, 9, 10, 4]) are 
addressing a different (and preceding) phase of the process,  the very interesting and challenging 
problem of generating the high-level maneuver COA. In addressing the style of interactions between the 
human and the decision aid, we de-emphasize the mixed-initiative, incremental style (even though 
CADET allows such a style) in favor of a rapid style of generating a complete plan from a high-level 
COA, followed by manual modifications. Motivations include the desire to minimize the time-
consuming aspects of a mixed-initiative process; to avoid significant dependencies on the style of user 
interfaces; and to eliminate the additional complexity of still poorly understood issues of mixed initiative 
in an already very complex problem.   
Integration of Multiple Problem Aspects   
The integration of multiple distinct problems within the overall process is achieved via an algorithm for 
tightly interleaved incremental planning, routing, time estimating, scheduling, estimates of attrition and 
consumption, and adversarial reaction estimation. This interleaving approach descends conceptually 
from [11] where similar interleaving applied to a design domain. 
  As shown in Fig. 8a, the hierarchical task network-like planning step produces an incremental 
group of tasks by applying domain-specific expansion rules (Fig. 8b) to those activities in the current 
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state of the plan that require hierarchical decomposition. The intuition behind the interleaved 
incremental approach is that a relatively small incremental expansion is adequately informed by the 
preceding decisions, while at the same time avoids forcing extensive commitments to future decisions. 
Consistent with this intuition, we observed that both very large and very small increments tend to 
produce solutions of lower quality. In CADET, a typical increment amounts to about 10-20 activities, on 
the order of 5% of the number of activities in a completed plan.  
  The incremental expansion process is controlled by a mechanism that leads the algorithm to 
focus on the most significant and most constrained tasks first, Fig. 8c, and to limit the decomposition to 
a limited incremental set of tasks. The scheduling step performs temporal constraint propagation (both 
lateral and vertical within the hierarchy, a partially domain-knowledge driven process), as in Figure 8d, 
and schedules the newly added activities to the available resources and time periods, shown in Figure 8e.    
  The temporal constraint propagation component of the scheduling sub-process performs an 
analysis of all temporal constraints, and adjusts the possible scheduling times of each constrained 
activity. The temporal representation of an activity consists of an interval of possible start times, an 
interval of possible end times, and a minimum and maximum duration. Each temporal constraint 
establishes a relationship between the start or end time of two activities. For example the constraint 
“SEIZE starts [00:30, 02:00] before SECURE starts,” establishes the requirement that the scheduled 
start time of the SEIZE activity must occur 30 minutes to 2 hours earlier than the scheduled start time of 
the SECURE activity. The propagation of a temporal constraint sets the possible start or end interval of a 
constrained activity to the intersection of the initial possible interval with the interval produced when 
applying the temporal constraint to the other activity in the relationship. 
  The interleaving approach also meets the users desire to see how the process unfolded.  It allows 
the user, if desired, to control the number of task expansions. Users could step through the entire process 
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in bite-size expansions consisting of about 10 sub-tasks at a time, and could intervene with interim 
modifications.  However, the significance of this mode of user operation should not be overestimated. 
Indeed, typically users would step through the process only a few times.  After they became familiar 
with the system and confident in its conclusions, they would thereafter choose to fully expand the plan 
without performing the step-wise expansion.    
With respect to the scheduling sub-process, although we originally planned to use a Multi-
decompositional version of the Constrained Heuristic Search [7, 12, 13, 28], we were led eventually to 
prefer a much simpler and computationally inexpensive scheduling heuristics. These combine domain-
independent estimate of the degree to which an activity is constrained, the "earliest-first" rule, and the 
domain-specific ranking of activity priorities. This choice was driven partly by the rigorous performance 
requirements, and partly by the fact that the simpler approach tended to produce results more 
understandable to the users.  Generally, given the compound complexity imposed by the need for tight 
interleaving of multiple, diverse problem-solving processes in CADET, it is prudent to avoid any 
unnecessary complexity within each of these individual processes.  
 The same interleaving mechanism is also used to integrate incremental steps of routing, attrition 
and consumption estimates. A version of the Dijkstra routing algorithm [16] is used to search for 
suitable routes over the terrain represented efficiently as a parameterized network of trafficable terrain. 
Optimization can be specified with respect to a number of factors, such as the overall speed of 
movement or cover and concealment. For estimates of attrition, we developed a special version of the 
Dupuy algorithm [14] calibrated with respect to estimates of military professionals [29]. 
 The same desire to minimize the complexity of the combined problem-solving process also 
played a role in our decision to use a no-backtracking approach (with a few minor exceptions). 
However, even more important considerations had to do with the nature of the problem and the role of 
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the user. We found a user would often find a way to mitigate or to permit infeasibilities (among which 
the temporal constraint infeasibilities are by far the most numerous; others include insufficient supplies, 
or unfavorable strength ratios in engagements) by means that are unique to the situation or rely on 
insights and highly detailed knowledge that go well beyond the limits of CADET's knowledge base.   
 Furthermore, such resolutions of infeasibilities by the user are usually best done when the user 
can see the "whole picture" of the plan.  For example, reviewing a constraint violation, the user might 
say, "I am willing to accept this risk in this particular situation in order to achieve my objective." 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that in a military conflict where both opponents are applying every 
effort to win, the problem solution is often found at constraint boundaries. We also found that 
infeasibilities often point to a need for modifications in the original COA, i.e., the sketch-and-statement 
level of the problem statement, which is human-generated and outside of CADET's purview. All the 
above considerations led us to dismiss a backtracking-based approach would be largely useless. Instead, 
CADET continues the solution process even when infeasibility is found, generates the complete (albeit 
infeasible) solution, displays the solution to the user with infeasibilities highlighted, and then lets the 
user make the appropriate changes. 
Planning Against a Dynamic Enemy 
The adversarial aspects of planning-scheduling problems are addressed via the same incremental 
expansion mechanism. CADET accounts for adversarial activity in several ways. First, it allows the 
commander and staff to specify the likely actions of the enemy. The automated planning then proceeds, 
taking into account, in parallel, both the friendly and enemy actions. Further, CADET automatically 
infers (using its knowledge base and using the same expansion technique used for hierarchical task 
network planning) possible reactions and counteractions, and provides for resources and timing 
necessary to incorporate them into the overall plan.  We adopted the Action-Reaction-Counteraction 
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(ARC) heuristic technique used in the traditional COA analysis phase of the Military Decision Making 
Process [2]. In the Action-Reaction-Counteraction (ARC) approach, an action possible by either friendly 
or enemy warrants examination for potential reactions.  This is followed with further analysis to 
determine if there exists a counter-action that can be used to minimize the impact of the reaction or 
negate its effects completely. The ARC technique was augmented with parallel planning for both 
friendly and enemy forces.  
  Consider the example of the activity called "forward passage of lines," see Figures 9a and 9b, in 
which a unit of force passes through the lines of defense manned by a friendly unit and then engages the 
enemy. When performing this activity, both the unit being passed, and the passing unit, are susceptible 
to enemy artillery fire. Therefore, CADET's knowledge base includes a method that, in the process of 
expanding this activity (Fig. 8b), postulates that if the enemy has suitable forces, it will react by 
attacking by fire the passing unit.  The method searches for enemy artillery units within the range from 
the location of the passage of lines, and creates the (hypothetic) enemy reaction activity "artillery fire" 
performed by the available enemy unit.  This in turn triggers the generation of counteraction activities.  
  Counteraction activities may be viewed as proactive measures to mitigate risks.  The friendly 
force commander, anticipating an effort by the enemy to concentrate artillery fires during the passage of 
lines, preplans the appropriate counter-battery fires and has them ready to execute on short notice, 
enabling him to respond vigorously within seconds of the enemy reaction.  To achieve this effect in 
CADET, the "artillery fire" activity includes a method for generating counteractions, such as a military 
intelligence activity of locating the enemy artillery that is performing the artillery fire, and a "counter-
battery fire" activity against the attacking artillery unit. When the "artillery fire" activity undergoes the 
expansion process, this method searches for suitable units and, if available, creates and assigns the 
counteraction activities to them. At the allocation step (Fig. 8d), these reaction and counteraction 
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activities execute their respective methods to estimate the attrition and consumption resulting from the 
execution of the activities.  
 Note that the reaction definition is not limited to a single possible reaction as described in the 
above example. It is possible to define in the knowledge base a set of possible reactions one or several of 
which are selected based on the state of the battlefield. 
 ACR does not involve an explicit search, in the sense that it does not explicitly explore multiple 
alternative moves at each decision point, and it does not involve backtracking, except for the user-driven 
backtracking as discussed in section “Integration of Multiple Problem Aspects.” Instead, the process 
proceeds in a linear, depth-first fashion (Fig. 9a and 9b): for every newly generated action, the ARC 
method of the activity (if one is specified within the KB) produces an activity (or activities) representing 
the enemy reaction; the reaction activity in turn trigger a similar generation of counteraction activities.  
 To prevent this process from continuing indefinitely, the algorithm terminates at the 
(heuristically) fixed depth of 3, i.e., an action is followed by reaction which is followed by 
counteraction, but at this point the chain ends and counteraction is not followed by yet another counter-
counter-action.  
 Justification for this termination heuristic if found in the experience of domain experts, as well as 
in our experimental observation that going beyond the depth of 3 produces excessive level of details 
without contributing to the value of the solution for the user. In effect, the cumulative level of 
uncertainty (will the reaction actually happen when the battle unfolds? Will the counteraction be actually 
applicable?) becomes so high that planning at a further level of detail is unproductive. Even at the 
seemingly short cutoff depth of 3, the solutions are often complex and non-obvious to the user.   
19 
 The ARC process does not search for an optimal solution and does not guarantee one. Rather, the 
intent is to produce a solution that is consistent with user’s expectations and doctrinal training and is 
produced much faster and more accurately than in the manual process.  
 Clearly, a suboptimal solution can occur in the ARC algorithm. For example, a reaction 
produced by the ARC method may turn out to be highly vulnerable, under a specific set of 
circumstances, to a counteraction. In such a case, this reaction would unlikely to be employed by an 
intelligent enemy and a large portion of the plan becomes erroneous. .  
 Although ARC does not guarantee optimality, it produces solutions of the quality that experts 
find comparable to those of human experts (section “Experimental Evaluation”). The rules that generate 
reactions and counteractions embody expert knowledge. The probability of generating a grossly 
suboptimal solution is minimized because the rules that generate a reaction do implicitly account for 
probable counteractions. 
 It should be emphasized that the problem addressed by ARC is not directly comparable to a 
game formulation. In particular, action and reactions are not comparable to moves in a sequential game 
because they do not need to occur in a sequential order, e.g. a reaction may in fact be executed prior to 
action, and counteraction – prior to reaction (see Fig. 9a). Nevertheless, the game-theoretic analogy is 
appropriate here in the sense that an ideal planner in CADET would have to explore the entire game tree 
(with appropriate pruning applied) in order to be assured of the optimality of a particular action 
(compare [26]). The ARC approach, however, trades optimality for speed and transparency of solution. 
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Knowledge Representation 
In the object-oriented fashion, the CADET Knowledge Base (KB) is a hierarchy of classes of activities, 
see Fig. 13. A class of activities (e.g., Fig. 10) contains a number of procedures (methods) responsible 
for: computing conditions of applicability of an expansion method; generating sub-activities of an 
activity depending on such factors as the available assets, the terrain or the location and type of the 
enemy forces (e.g., Fig 10c); adding temporal constraints; estimating timing and resources required for 
the activity(e.g., Fig 10d, 10e, 10g, and 10h); finding suitable routes and locations (e.g., Fig 10f); etc. 
When there are multiple rules within a procedure (e.g., see Fig. 10c), they are explicitly ordered.  
  In practice, the most expensive (in terms of development and maintenance costs) part of the 
Knowledge Base (KB) are the rules responsible for expansion of activities. We find a great variability in 
the procedures used to evaluate preconditions of expansion and the expansion itself. While some are 
very simple, others are complex. Many, for example, refer to qualitative geographic and temporal 
relations between units of force and features of the battlefield and require significant computations using 
general-purpose programming operators. 
  Consider (Fig. 11) an example of a complex expansion procedure that applies to a common class 
of activities in which a military units advances on the battlefield along an axis of advance or a route. 
When performing an advance, the sub-activities or auxiliary activities of the unit are largely defined by 
the battlefield state along the route being traversed. For example, the advancing units may encounter 
enemy units, or obstacles, or require a resupply.  
  The procedure described in Fig. 11 generates an ordered set of activities based on a projected 
(estimated for future time points) state of the battlefield. The generation of each activity updates the 
projected state for use in the generation of future activities. Although the procedure includes elements of 
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sequencing and time-dependent effects, the actual scheduling of the activities generated is delayed until 
the execution of the scheduling algorithm (see Fig. 8c and Fig. 8d).  
  The expansion procedure is parameterized to allow the generation of a variety of actions based 
upon the requirements of the specific activity modeled. For example, the reaction to encountering an 
enemy unit is different when the advance is performed for the purpose of seizing an objective, as 
compared to an advance performed for the purposes of a feint attack. 
 A class of activity has only one expansion procedure, e.g., Fig. 10c, even though a number of 
different sets of expanded activities may result from an application of a  given expansion procedure, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, the procedure described in Fig. 10c produces different 
expansions depending of whether the unit is within the suitable distance from the desired minefield 
location or needs to move toward the location, and whether the unit has enough mines on hand or needs 
to replenish its stocks.  
 A different approach would be to encode such alternative expansions as independent rules and let 
a search process to determine the applicable rules depending on preconditions and on downstream 
outcomes. We found it preferable to handle all alternative expansions within a single procedure. The 
number of expansions in this domain tends to be modest and can be more easily and explicitly controlled 
within a single procedure. This is also consistent with our desire to avoid search and backtracking, as 
discussed in detail in section “Integration of Multiple Problem Aspects.” 
  CADET includes a module for Knowledge Base (KB) maintenance that allows a non-
programmer to add new units of knowledge or over-write old ones, in a relatively simple point-and-click 
fashion. There is a clear need to allow the end-users an ability to modify the KB in field environments, 
and the assumption is that the user is not a programmer, not even to the extent of a entering a 
spreadsheet-like function. Although necessarily limited by our decision to eliminate any direct 
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programming features, the KB maintenance tool does allow an end-user to enter potentially a majority of 
the required activity classes, albeit clearly not all. 
User Interfaces  
Only a minimal set of necessary user interface features were developed. These consisted mainly of an 
interface patterned after the synchronization matrix (Fig. 6, 7), allowing the user to click on any cell 
(activity) and browse through the related network of domain-relevant objects (e.g., the units performing 
the activity, the location of the unit, etc.). The reason for a minimal interface is that we do not expect 
CADET to be deployed with a stand-alone user interface, but rather as a part of a larger framework with 
an existing interface. 
  Even more important was our realization that the presentation paradigms accepted in the practice 
of military decision making are not necessarily a good basis for user interfaces in a tool like CADET. In 
a series of experiments (to be discussed shortly) we found, in particular, that although the 
synchronization matrix is an accepted way of recording the results of COA analysis, the users of 
CADET had some difficulty comprehending the synchronization matrix generated by the computer tool, 
even though it was presented in a very conventional, presumably familiar manner. One possible 
explanation is that the synchronization matrix works well only as a mechanism for short-hand recording 
of one’s own mental process. However, the same synchronization matrix is not nearly as effective when 
used to present the results of someone else’s, e.g., CADET’s, reasoning. The problem was further 
exacerbated by the fact that CADET-generated matrices were unusually detailed and therefore large, 
making it difficult for the users to navigate within this large volume of information. 
Experimental Evaluation 
 How does planning with CADET compare with purely manual planning?  We desired to know 
what difference the tool would make when put in the hands of the military staff planner.   
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  In the course of interviewing experienced military planners for the purpose of knowledge 
acquisition, we had been offered varying opinions concerning the potential usefulness of such a tool in 
the hands of a staff planner.  Some described tactical planning as more art than science and dismissed 
any attempt to automate portions of the process.  Some thought the process would greatly benefit 
planners with minimal experience in the field.  Still others, questioned the degree to which the tool 
would avoid generating predictable (to the enemy) products.  They argued that any plan produced in part 
or in whole by a computerized system would inevitably involve a simplistic and predictable approach.  
These concerns were addressed via an experiment. 
 The experiment involved five different scenarios of Brigade-sized offensive operations, nine 
judges (all Army or Marine field grade officers (Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel or Major), mostly active 
duty), four types of planning products for each scenario, and three individual grades that the judges were 
asked to assign to the products.  
   The brigade is commonly the lowest level with a dedicated planning cell within the headquarters 
staff.  At the same time, even at a relatively low echelon, the military is relying on improvements in 
decision support tools to improve tactical decision making without increasing the size of battlefield 
staffs. [15] 
 The five scenarios were obtained from several exercises conducted by the US Army in recent 
years. All scenarios differed significantly in terrain, mix of friendly forces, nature of opposing forces, 
and scheme of maneuver. For each scenario/COA we located the original COA sketches assigned to 
each planning staff, and the original hand-written synchronization matrices produced by each planning 
staff. In a few cases, the original COA statement was unavailable and had to be reconstructed based on 
the sketch and the synchronization matrix.  
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 Although we did not have the specific records of how many officers were involved in these 
planning sessions and how many hours the sessions lasted, the participants and observers of similar 
exercises estimated that typically these are performed by a team of 4-5 officers, over the period of 3-4 
hours, amounting to a total of about 16 person-hours per planning product.  
 Taking the five synchronization matrices produced by the human staff, we transcribed them from 
the original handwritten spreadsheets into a computerized spreadsheet, in order to make them visually 
less distinct from the computer-generated ones. This set of 5 matrices is referred to as Hand-Human 
(HH), meaning, “produced by hand and retaining the original human-made style.” 
 The same matrices were then edited to make them look machine-generated. The rationale for 
doing this was to minimize the possibility of biases of the evaluators against or in favor of 
computerization. This “disguise” involved standardization of terms and abbreviations, uniform style, 
elimination of spelling errors, etc. However, all essential content remained unaltered. This set of 5 
matrices is referred to as Hand-Machine (HM), meaning “produced by hand and disguised with a 
machine-looking style.” 
 Using the same scenarios and COAs, we used CADET to generate a detailed plan and a 
synchronization matrix. The matrices were then reviewed and edited by a surrogate user, a retired US 
Army officer. The editing was rather light – in all cases it involved changing or deleting no more than 2-
3% of entries on the matrix.  This reflected the expected mode of operation – CADET is not expected to 
be used automatically, but rather in collaboration with a human decision-maker. 
 CADET was used “as-is.” No attempt was made to customize, tailor or extend CADET’s 
knowledge base for these scenarios.  
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 The time to generate these products involved less than 2 minutes of CADET execution, and 
about 20 minutes of review and post-editing, for a total of about 0.4 person-hours per product. 
(Although it also took a certain amount of time to enter the sketch-and-statement information into 
CADET, we do not consider this time because in a realistic digital environment the sketch-and-
statement information would be transmitted to the planning staff in a digital format.)  
 The resulting matrices were transferred to a computerized spreadsheet and given the same visual 
style as that of Hand-Human (HH) and Hand-Machine (HM) sets. This set is referred to as Computer-
Machine (CM), meaning “produced with computer support and retaining the original machine-made 
style.” 
 The same Computer-Machine (CM) matrices were then edited to give them a “human-made” 
look but without changing any content. In particular, some common spelling errors were introduced, 
some “human” inconsistencies in terminology and abbreviations, etc. The rationale, again, was to elicit 
in our experiments any differences in evaluations that might result from computer-aversion. This set is 
referred to as Computer-Human (CH), meaning “produced with computer support and disguised with 
human-made style.” 
 The nine judges, evaluators of the products, were recruited primarily from active duty officers of 
US Army and Marines, mainly of Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel ranks, and two recently retired senior 
officers with extensive experience with current military doctrine.  A total of 20 evaluation packages 
were prepared for the judges: 5 HH, 5 HM, 5 CM and 5 CH. Each package consisted of a sketch, 
statement, synchronization matrix and a questionnaire that instructed the judges on how to grade the 
products.  
 To avoid evaluation biases, assignments of packages to judges were fully randomized. Each 
judge was asked to evaluate 4 packages. Judges were not told by what means the products were created. 
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Furthermore, to avoid any biases that could arise from a direct comparison of products, a judge never 
received any two packages related to the same scenario.  
 Each judge was asked to review a package and to provide 3 grades: one grade that characterizes 
the correctness and feasibility of the plan as reflected in the synchronization matrix, on the scale of 1-10; 
one grade that characterizes the completeness and thoroughness of the plan as reflected in the 
synchronization matrix, on the scale of 1-10; and one qualitative grade that compares the plan with 
typical products they see in today’s Army practice (ranging from “much worse” to “much better”). 
Instructions to the judges were worded in a way that associated the grade of 5 with the "typical quality 
found in today's practice." 
 Data showed a significant scatter (Fig.12). While mean values for the 4 series ranged from 3.9-
5.0, standard deviations ranged from 1.6-2.4. Judges comments also demonstrated significant differences 
of opinion regarding the same product. We did not find any bias against computerized-looking products. 
 Some judges strongly disliked the larger and more detailed synchronization matrices produced 
by CADET. From some judges' comments, it appeared that they assumed that these highly detailed 
products were generated in a conventional process, and that staff officers were wasting their time and 
attention by going into such excessive and unusual level of detail. Perhaps this suggests that merely by 
reducing the size and level of details shown on the synchronization matrix (which can be easily done 
automatically), one could improve the grades given to the CADET’s products.  
 Overall, the results (Fig.12) demonstrated that CADET performed on par with the human staff - 
the difference between CADET’s and human performance was statistically insignificant. Taking the 
mean of grades for all five scenarios, CADET earned 4.2, and humans earned 4.4, with standard 
deviation of about 2.0, a very insignificant difference. Finally, comparing the “undisguised” results, i.e., 
series CM and HH, CADET earned the mean grade of 4.4 and humans earned 3.9, although the 
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difference is still rather small. The conclusion: CADET helps produce complex planning products 
dramatically (almost two orders of magnitude) faster yet without loss of quality, as compared to the 
conventional, manual process.  
Experiments in a More Realistic Setting 
Another experimental exploration [3] placed the CADET component in a more realistic setting, 
integrated in a suite of decision aids and suitable for performing a complete cycle of the Army Brigade 
decision-making. Sponsored and performed by an Army Battle Command Battle Lab, this set of 
experiments approximated the use of battle planning aids by a group of officers in a Brigade Command 
Post.  
  The experimenters focused on broader issues associated with potential negative impacts of such 
tools on the creative aspects of the art of war. Will such tools encourage excessive fixation on analytical 
aspects of command, by the book and by numbers? Will they detract from intuitive, adaptive, art-like 
aspects of the military command decision-making? Will it make the plans and actions more predictable 
to the enemy?  
  The experiments involved two teams, each consisting of eight Army officers (majors and 
lieutenant colonels) at Battle Command Battle Laboratory-Leavenworth facilities in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. All the subjects were from combat arms branches and had a variety of tactical experience, with 
11-23 years of Active Service. One team performed a typical process of decision-making using the 
traditional manual method. The other team accomplished the same tasks with the support of the decision 
aids, particularly CADET.  
  The observations during the processes of both teams, and the comparison of the products 
dispelled the concerns. The quality of the products generated by both teams was comparable even 
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though the computer-aided team completed its tasks much faster. There was no evidence that the 
decision aids would in any way encourage a cookbook approach. To the contrary, because they allow the 
planners to explore rapidly a broader range of possible courses of action, including those that are 
unconventional, there is a potential for such tools to encourage greater ingenuity, creativity and 
adaptivity.   
Lessons Learned and Future Directions 
CADET is a tool developed to generate Army battle plans with realistic degree of detail and 
completeness, for multiple battle operating systems, for the large scale and scope associated with such 
complex organizations as an Army Division or a Brigade. CADET performs dramatically faster than a 
conventional human-only planning staff, with comparable quality of planning products. 
  CADET shows a promise of reaching the state where a military decision-maker, a commander or 
a staff planner, uses it in field conditions, as a part of an integrated suite of tools available on a rugged, 
highly portable computer device. He would use it routinely to perform planning of tactical operations, to 
issue operational plans and orders, and to monitor and modify the plans as the operation is executed and 
the situation evolves.  
 The CADET technology was designed for a particular application domain – military operations 
planning. The results of our experiments, as well as the interest in the CADET technology expressed by 
several organizations within the US military, offer evidence that the technology is likely to be of value 
in its primary intended  application domain. The military planning domain is in itself a very large 
market, with a broad range of sub-domains and problems (e.g., pre-operation planning, in-execution 
management, simulation, training, military robotics, etc.), and with a major amount of funding dedicated 
annually to introducing and improving intelligent applications, many of which can leverage the CADET 
technology. 
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 Outside of the military applications world, CADET’s technical approach may also be considered 
for use in other domains that require either a close integration of planning and scheduling and movement 
routing, or explicit planning for potential adverse effects of actions and the appropriate precautions, i.e., 
a kind of adversarial reasoning. The former category may include for example construction industry 
planning, especially in multiple geographically dispersed projects. The latter category may include law 
enforcement, disaster response (an exploratory prototype using CADET has been already constructed), 
business campaign planning (market penetration, new product release, marketing campaigns, etc.), and 
industrial or space robotics (compare with [24] where an adversarial planner was used for a space 
robotics application.)  CADET-like approach may also serve as a component of solution to a much 
broader problem of society-wide activities, e.g., international interventions, that involve not only 
military but also long-term political, economic, social and ideological processes [30].  
  A number of practical lessons have been learnt:  
-- Adopting or developing a simple and transparent concept of user operation helps to increase the 
probability of user acceptance and to reduce the developmental risks and training requirements. Such 
a concept does not necessarily coincide with (and in fact is likely to be significantly different from) 
the established ways of performing similar processes in a manual fashion.  
-- The problem of battle planning is an instructive example of a real-world problem where distinct 
computational problems are closely coupled and do not lend themselves to a useful decomposition. 
One effective, practical approach to such problems can be the tight interleaving of incremental 
planning, scheduling, routing and attrition and consumption calculations. 
-- Given the complexity of interleaving multiple, diverse computational problem-solving processes, 
it is prudent for developers to reduce technical risks by using less complicated algorithms in each of 
30 
the individual processes. Computationally inexpensive algorithms that often trade optimality for 
speed help to assure an almost instantaneous response to the user, which is important in military 
applications.  
-- The Action-Reaction-Counteraction (ARC) heuristic can be a practical, robust technique for 
integrating adversarial considerations into the planning process.  
-- Conventional presentation paradigms rooted in manual procedures are not always a suitable basis 
for an effective user interface. Rigorous separation – both architectural and conceptual - of problem 
solving components from user interaction mechanisms allows for integration with a variety of user-
interface paradigms.  
 
Key gaps that must be overcome to realize the full potential of such tools:  
  Military decision-making commonly requires collaboration of multiple officers with distinct 
functions, responsibilities and expertise. In the near-future warfare, these officers will often collaborate 
while dispersed over the battlefield, communicating over the tactical internet, possibly asynchronously. 
Tools like CADET must support such forms of collaboration.  
  Effective human-machine interfaces remain challenging, especially for complex, multi-
dimensional information such as plans and execution of military operations, in high-tempo, high-stress 
environments, in physically challenging field conditions. Today’s common paradigms – map-based 
visualizations of spatial information and synchronization matrix for temporal visualization – are not 
necessarily the most promising directions, and different approaches ought to be explored. 
  Presentation of CADET's products requires qualitatively different user interfaces and 
visualization mechanisms. Our experiments suggest that the users had difficulties comprehending a 
computer-generated synchronization matrix, even though it was presented in a very conventional, 
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familiar manner. Perhaps, the synchronization matrix functions well only as a mechanism for short-hand 
recording of one’s own mental process. However, the same synchronization matrix is not nearly as 
useful when used to present the results of someone else’s, e.g., a computer tool’s, reasoning. 
  Combat planners must be able to plan rapidly, communicate orders to subordinates clearly and 
react without delay to changes in the situation. Planning tools like CADET should give the commander 
the ability to accelerate this cycle of recognition, re-planning and reaction, i.e., the capability of 
continuous re-planning during execution. 
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Figure 1. An example of a (partial) sketch and statement of a course of action.  
Figure 2. An example synchronization matrix (partial) produced in a conventional, manual process, starting with the 
sketch and statement of Fig.1. Such products are usually drawn by hand on a preprinted template of a 
synchronization matrix. More recently, these are commonly produced with a personal computer, using conventional 
programs for office presentation graphics and spreadsheets. 
Figure 3.  A COA sketch developed in one of several COA-editing tools that have been used as data-entry interfaces to 
CADET. A sketch typically includes symbols of friendly and enemy units, assembly areas, objectives, mobility corridors, 
axes of attacks, etc.  
 
Figure 4. An example of the input to CADET, a representation of a traditional 
sketch and statement. 
 
Units of force: 
Unit(‘Blue-Bn-1’, Blue, Infantry, Battalion, initalLocationCoordinates = ..., strength = 1.00) 
Unit(‘Red-Co-1’, Red, Armor, Company, initialLocationCoordinates = ..., strength = 0.80) 
... (typically a total of 5-50 units) 
Control measures: 
ControlMeasure(‘Sword’, type = ObjectiveArea, boundaryPoints = {...}) 
ControlMeasure('mc-1', type=Mobility Corridor, trafficability = high, segmentPoints = {...}) 
... (typically 50-500 entities) 
Activities: 
Activity('Seize-1', type=seizeObjective, Blue, candidateUnits = {Blue-Bn-1, Blue-Bn-4... }, 
objectiveArea = Sword) 
Activity('Attack-1', type=attack, Blue, targets = {Red-Co-1}, intent = attrit) 
... (typically 2-20 activities, including both blue and red activities) 
 Temporal constraints: 
Constraint(Seize-1, ends, range = {0min, 2hours}, before, Attack-1, starts) 
... (typically 2-20 constraints) 
 
 
Figure 5a.  Planners face the need to perform detailed logistical analysis including projected ordnance and fuel 
consumption and supply chain planning at several echelons. These graphs show the results of the logistical analysis, 
and attrition estimation for a single unit over the course of the plan. 
Figure 5b.  In this display of the logistics analysis and attrition estimates for all resources together, the human 
planner’s attention is drawn to the shortage of ammunition (red and black cells).  Without human intervention in the 
planning process, this unit will become critically low on ammunition over time. 
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Figure 6.  CADET takes a sketch and statement as an input, and produces 
detailed plan/schedule of hundreds of tasks, usage of resources, risks and 
losses, actions of the enemy, and routing. 
 
Time 
Figure 7.  The main output of CADET is a large synchronization table (a 
small fraction of a typical product is shown here) that shows a function a of 
time the recommended tasks of the friendly force, projected activities of the 
enemy, and status of resources for the participating units of the force.     
Figure 8a. The algorithms used to produce a plan, and to 
produce a partial plan. 
 
procedure ProducePlan() 
1.  while planning is not complete do 
2.       actList  list of unexpanded, unallocated activities 
3.       ProducePartialPlan(actList, 10) 
 
procedure ProducePartialPlan(Activities A, Integer maxCount) 
1.  newActivityCount  0 
2.  while A   and newActivityCount < maxCount do 
3.     highestPriorityAct  GetHighestPriorityAct(A) 
4.     if highestPriorityAct requires expansion then 
5.         newActs  Expand(highestPriorityAct) 
6.         newActivityCount   newActs + newActivityCount 
7.         A  newActs  A 
8.         PropagateTimeConstraints(highestPriorityAct) 
9.         foreach Activity act  newActs do 
10.             PropagateTimeConstraints(act) 
11.     while  highestPriorityAct is not ready for scheduling do 
12.         highestPriorityAct  GetHighestPriorityAct (A) 
13.     Schedule(highestPriorityAct) 
Figure 8b. The algorithm describing the general steps of an activity expansion. 
The value returned is the set of all activities generated during the 
expansion. 
 
function Expand(Activity expandingAct, Time earliestStartTime, BattlefieldState S) : Activities 
1.  S  a projection of the battlefield state S at earliestStartTime. 
2.  candidateResources  CalculateCandidateResources(S.AllResources) 
3.  startPt  CalculateStartPoint(candidateResources, earliestStartTime, S) 
4.  endPt  CalculateEndPoint(S) 
5.  if  startPt != endPt then 
6.     aPath  CalculatePath(startPt, endPt, S.DirectedGraph, earliestStartTime)  
7.     advanceActs  Advance(candidateResources, aPath, earliestStartTime, S) 
8.     update S to reflect the projected effects of advanceActs 
9.  newActs  additional activities, reaction, and counteraction derived from expandingAct 
10.  create time constraints between expandingAct, newActs, and advanceActs 
11.  return newActs   advanceActs 
Figure 8c. Retrieve the highest priority activity.  
 
function GetHighestPriorityAct(Activities A) : Activity 
1.  highestPriorityAct  null 
2.  foreach Activity act  A do 
3.     if act is more temporally restricted than highestPriorityAct 
4.             or CalculatePriority(act) > CalculatePriority(highestPriorityAct)  
5.             or [CalculatePriority(act) = CalculatePriority(highestPriorityAct)  
6.             and act.LatestEndTime > highestPriorityAct.LatestEndTime ]  
7.         highestPriorityAct  act 
8.  return highestPriorityAct 
Figure 8d. Propagate temporal constraints for an activity.  
 
procedure PropagateTimeConstraints(Activity fromAct) 
1.  foreach Constraint tc  fromAct.AllConstraints do 
2.     toAct  tc.getOtherActivity(fromAct) 
3.     if tc has not been propagated in this propagation cycle and toAct is not scheduled then  
4.         ci  the timing interval, start or end, of fromAct that is constrained by tc 
5.         si  the interval of possible start times for toAct 
6.         ei  the interval of possible end times for toAct 
7.         if tc effects si and tc applied to any value in ci produces a value outside the interval si then 
8.             si becomes the intersection of si and the interval produced from the application of tc over ci 
9.         if tc effects ei and tc is not valid for ei and ci then 
10.             ei becomes the intersection of ei and the interval produced from the application of tc over ci 
11.         PropagateTimeConstraints(toAct) 
Figure 8e. The algorithm used to schedule an activity.  
 
procedure Schedule(Resources candidateResources, Activity actToSchedule) 
1.  while actToSchedule is not scheduled and candidateResources list is not empty do 
2.     duration  CalculateDuration(candidateResources0, actToSchedule) 
3.     for Time possibleStartTime from actToSchedule.EarliestStart to actToSchedule.LatestStart do 
4.         endTime   possibleStartTime + duration 
5.         if  endTime is within [earliestEndTime, latestEndTime]  
6.                 and candidateResources0 has no assignments over [possibleStartTime, endTime] then 
7.             RecordConsumption(startTime, endTime, candidateResources0) 
8.             schedule the activity from startTime to endTime 
9.         else 
10.             Remove(candidateResources0, candidateResources) 
Figure 9a. A typical example of the series of expansions which produce an action, reaction, and counteraction (ARC). The 
activity initially expanded is a passage of lines with an expansion as shown in A. The reaction activity is produced when 
generating the ARCs of the passage of lines, shown in B, and is temporally constrained to occur prior to the action. The 
generation of ARCs for the enemy fire on the passage point produces the two counteractions shown in C. 
A B C 
Figure 9b. Two examples of action-reaction-counteraction calculation methods. The first 
method called during the expansion of a passage of lines generates and synchronizes an 
artillery fire. The second is called during the expansion of the artillery fire, and 
generates a counteraction consisting of counterbattery activities.  
 
function GenerateActionReactionCounteraction(Activity passageAct, BattlefieldState S) : Activities 
1. candidateResources  CalculateCandidateResources(S.AllResources) 
2.  If candidateResources exist and candidateResources are in range of passageAct.Location then 
3.     fireOnPP  new Activity (ARTILLERY FIRE, candidateResources) 
4.    CreateTimeConstraint(fireOnPP, STARTS, interval=[00:15, 00:30], BEFORE,  passageAct, STARTS) 
5.     return { fireOnPP } 
 
function GenerateActionReactionCounteraction(Activity fireOnPP, BattlefieldState S) : Activities 
1.  candidateResources  CalculateCandidateResources(S.AllResources)  
2.  If candidateResources exist and candidateResources are in range of fireOnPP.Location then 
3.     counterbattery  new Activity (ARTILLERY FIRE, candidateResources) 
4.     findEnemy  new Activity (FIND ENEMY, candidateResources) 
5.     CreateTimeConstraint(counterbattery, STARTS, interval=[00:00, 00:00], BEFORE,  fireOnPP, STARTS) 
6.     CreateTimeConstraint(findEnemy, STARTS, interval=[00:00, 00:00], BEFORE, fireOnPP, STARTS) 
7.     CreateTimeConstraint(counterbattery, ENDS, interval=[00:00, 00:00], BEFORE,  fireOnPP, ENDS) 
8.     return { findEnemy, counterbattery } 
Figure 10a. An example of an activity description. 
 
Activity Class Name: Emplace a Scatterable Minefield 
Required Inputs: The location, width, and intent of the minefield. 
Scheduling and allocation priority (Figure 10b): High priority if the activity 
is a part of the Main Effort, medium otherwise.  
Expansion Method (Figure 10c): Create a series of activities that move the 
unit into a position in firing range of the desired minefield location. If 
additional ordnance is required generate an activity of supplying the required 
ordnance,. Create temporal constraints on the sub-activities.  
Method to estimate the duration of this activity (Figure 10d): Calculate 
using a combination of tables and algebraic formulae based on the number of 
vehicles in the unit capable of firing the required ordnance, the intent and 
dimensions of the minefield, and the rate at which the unit can fire the 
specified ordnance type. 
Method to assign a resource (or a set of candidate resources) to this 
activity (Figure 10e): If available utilize artillery provided by the division. If 
divisional artillery is unavailable utilize the artillery unit organic to the main 
effort of the COA.  
Method to determine how much of the resource is required: Estimate the 
minimum size or fraction of the unit required to perform this activity based on 
a combination of tables and algebraic formulae considering the size of the 
minefield, its intent and type, capabilities of the unit, etc.  
Method to find start point of the activity (Figure 10f): Find the point where 
the assigned unit is located after completing the most recent preceding activity.  
Method to find the end point (Figure 10f): Find the point closest to the start 
point that is in firing range of the desired minefield location. 
Path finding method: Use the standard routing (a version of  Dijkstra) 
algorithm with a weighting scheme favoring paths with low threat and high 
accessibility.  
Ammo consumption estimation method (Figure 10g): Calculate using a 
formula involving the desired density, and dimensions of the minefield.  
Attrition estimation method: Calculate using a formula relating the fraction 
of personnel and equipment losses to the type of an engagement with hostile 
forces, the strengths of the forces, posture, environmental conditions, etc.  
Figure 10b. An example priority calculation algorithm as 
defined for a minefield emplacement activity 
 
function CalculatePriority(Activity emplaceAct, Resource aResource) : 
ActivityPriority 
1.  if aResource is a divisional resource then 
2.     return high priority 
3.  if emplaceAct is a part of the main effort then  
4.     return medium priority 
5.  else if emplaceAct is a part of the supporting effort  
6.         or aResource is a subordinate unit resource then 
7.     return low priority 
8.  return medium priority  
 
Figure 10c. An example expansion algorithm as defined for a minefield emplacement 
activity. 
 
function Expand(Activity expandingAct, Time earliestStartTime, Points minePts) : Activities 
1.  S  a projection of the battlefield state S at earliestStartTime 
2.  candidateResources  CalculateCandidateResources(S.AllResources) 
3.  startPt  CalculateStartPoint(candidateResources, earliestStartTime, S) 
4.  endPt  CalculateEndPoint(startPt, minePts, S.DirectedGraph, candidateResources) 
5.  if startPt  endPt then 
6.     moveAct  new Activity (MOVE, candidateResources, startPt, endPt) 
7.     CreateTimeConstraint(moveAct, ENDS, interval=[00:00, ], BEFORE,  expandingAct, STARTS) 
8.     newActivities  newActivities  { moveAct } 
9.     update S to reflect the effects of moveAct 
10.  if ordnance levels are below required levels and fuel is below required level then 
11.     supplyAct  new Activity(FULL RESUPPLY, candidateResources) 
12.  else if fuel is below required level 
13.     supplyAct  new Activity(BASIC REFUEL, candidateResources) 
14.  CreateTimeConstraint(supplyAct, ENDS, interval=[00:00, 00:30], BEFORE,  moveAct, STARTS) 
15.  newActivities  newActivities  { supplyAct }  
16.  return newActivities 
Figure 10d. An example duration calculation algorithm as defined 
for a minefield emplacement activity.  
 
function CalculateDuration(Resource aResource, MinefieldIntent mIntent, Number 
mWidth, MinefieldType mType) : Duration 
1.  numAPts  GetNumberOfAimingPoints(mType, mWidth) 
2.  density  GetRequiredDensity(mIntent) 
3.  rndsPerAPt  GetNumberOfRoundsPerAimingPoint(density, mType) 
4.  numVehicles  GetNumberOfVehiclesInUnit(HOWITZER, aResource) 
5.  firingRatePerVehicle  GetFiringRate(HOWITZER) 
6.  return (rndsPerAPt * numAPts) / (numVehicles * firingRatePerVehicle) 
Figure 10e. An example candidate resource calculation 
algorithm as defined for a minefield emplacement 
activity  
function CalculateCandidateResource(Resources allResources) : Resources 
1.  candidateResources  Empty List 
2.  foreach Resource r  allResources do 
3.     if r is on the side required for the activity and 
4.             r can perform artillery tasks and 
5.             r is provided by the division then 
6.         Insert (r, candidateResources)  
7.     else if r is on the side required for the activity and 
8.             r can perform artillery tasks and  
9.             r is a subordinate to the main effort of the COA then 
10.        Append(r, candidateResources) 
11.  return candidateResources  
 
Figure 10f. Example start and end point calculation algorithms as defined for 
a minefield emplacement activity 
 
function CalculateStartPoint(Resource aResource, Time startTime, BattlefieldState S) : Point 
1.  return the position of aResource at time startTime 
 
function CalculateEndPoint(Point startPoint, Points minefieldPoints, DirectedGraph dGraph, 
Resource aResource) : Point 
1.  sortedPointList  SortByProximityToPoint(dGraph.Points, startPoint) 
2.  i  0 
3.  while endPoint is null do 
4.     if DistanceBetween (sortedPointListi, minefieldPoints) < aResource.FiringRange  
5.             and a path exists between sortedPointListi, and minefieldPoints then 
6.         endPoint  sortedPointListi 
7.     i++ 
8.  return endPoint 
Figure 10g. Example fuel and ammunition consumption algorithm as defined for a 
minefield emplacement activity  
 
procedure RecordConsumption(Time startTime, Time endTime, Resource aResource) 
1.  density GetRequiredDensity(mIntent) 
2.  numAPts  GetNumberOfAimingPoints(mType, mWidth) 
3.  totalRequiredRounds  GetNumberOfRoundsPerAimingPoint(density, mType) * numAPts 
4. RecordConsumption(aResource, startTime, endTime, MINEFIELD_ORDNANCE, totalRequiredRounds) 
5. RecordConsumption(aResource, startTime, endTime, FUEL, NON_MOVING_FUEL_USAGE_RATE) 
6. RecordConsumption(aResource, startTime, endTime, STANDARD_ORDNANCE, 
BACKGROUND_STD_ORDNANCE_RATE) 
Figure 10h. Example attrition estimation algorithm as defined for an Attack activity. The calculation of the 
values for personnel and weapon systems attrition in steps 6 through 9 use the empirical coefficients 
derived partly from Dupuy [14]. 
 
procedure RecordAttrition(Time startTime, Time endTime, Resource aResource, Units targets) 
1.  friendlyAttritionFactor  An activity dependant factor applied to the friendly attrition 
2.  defStrength  0 
3.  foreach Unit u targets do 
4.     defStrength  defStrength + StrengthAtTime(u, startTime) 
5.  attStrength  StrengthAtTime(aResource, startTime) 
6.  attPersonnelAttrition  K * attPostureFactor*[(defStrength*terrainFactor*defPostureFactor)/attStrength]0.41 
7.  defPersonnelAttrition  K * defPostureFactor*[(defStrength*terrainFactor*defPostureFactor)/attStrength] -0.41 
8.  attWSAttrition  c * attPersonnelAttrition 
9.  defWSAttrition  c * defPersonnelAttrition 
10.  foreach Unit u targets do 
11.     RecordAttrition(u, startTime, endTime, WEAPONS_SYSTEMS, defWSAttrition) 
12.     RecordAttrition(u, startTime, endTime, PERSONNEL, defPersonnelAttrition) 
13.  RecordAttrition(aResource, startTime, endTime, WEAPONS_SYSTEMS, attWSAttrition* friendlyAttritionFactor) 
14.  RecordAttrition(aResource, startTime, endTime, PERSONNEL, attPersonnelAttrition* friendlyAttritionFactor) 
Figure 11. Expansion procedure for the activity class Advance. This function returns an 
ordered list of activities required to accomplish the advance. 
 
function Advance(Resource aResource, Path aPath, Time projectedStart, BattlefieldState S) : Activities 
1.  S  a projection of the battlefield state S at projectedStart 
2.  newActs  empty list 
3.  n  0   
4.  for i from 0 to aPath.NumSegments do 
5.     requiredActType  GetRequiredActivityType( aPath.Segmentsi, S ) 
6.     if newActsn.ActivityType = requiredActType then 
7.         update newActsn for the additional segment aPath.Segmentsi 
8.     else 
9.         newActsn+1  new Activity(requiredActType) 
10.         CreateTimeConstraint(newActsn+1,  STARTS, interval = [0, 02:00], AFTER, newActsn, ENDS) 
11.         n++ 
12.     update S  to reflect effects of  activity newActsn 
13.      generate any resupply activities required 
14.  return newActs 
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Figure 12. The judges were asked to grade the products of CADET and manual 
process on a scale of 0 to 10. The results, shown here for several subsets of products, 
are very similar, even though the computer-aided products were produced 
dramatically faster. 
Figure 13. A partial representation of the activity model 
 
